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THE TRANSFORMATIONOF
GUBERNATORIALPOWER AND
PRIVILEGEIN SOUTH CAROLINA
LutherF. Caner, Universityof Charleston
Few institutions in American government hav_e undergone the
abrupt transformation in power and privilege as that reafued by the
South Carolina governor over the past decade and a half. Still fewer
institutions began their transformation from such a relative position of
constitutional and statutory inadequacy. Viewed historically as one of
the weakest among the chief executives of the 50 states, the office was
described by V.O. Key in his seminal book Southern Politics in the
State and Nation as having the "narrowest sort of power of decision of
State Administration" . 1 Other, more recent, studies comparing the
formal powers of state governors have consistently affirmed the
structural frailties inherent in the South Carolina executive. These
studies have identified weak appointment powers, the absence of an
executive budget, and the inability to organize and reorganize as factors
which have traditionally curtailed gubernatorial authority and
prerogative. 2
Beginning in the early 1980s, executive governance began an
ascendency to a more visible, recognizable position within the hierarchy
of state politics . This movement and the events, expectations, and
cultural manifestations which have accompanied it have led to the
realization of a dynamic model of gubernatorial centrality and control
in contemporary South Carolina. The resulting impact on the
development of substantive policy has been profound, with the
governor becoming increasingly influential on both ends of the policy
continuum-initiation and implementation.
An analysis of this transformation provides a view of a rapidly
changing state institution and permits the assessment of shifting
legislative-executive branch authority across a single generation. Just
as importantly, it affords the opportunity to observe patterns of
institutional control and accountability emerge in response to a variety
183

Luther F. Caner
of political, economic and social pressures.
This article will examine these issues and attempt to identify
causal trends which have bolstered the posture of the executive during
the last few years. To facilitate the latter, the typologies of political
culture developed by Daniel Elazar will be employed to explain the
emerging patterns of gubernatorial authority. 3

1790-1980:The Symbolic and Hollow Executive
Historically, South Carolinians have abhorred executive authority.
As early as 1790, the first constitution of the state provided for the
legislature to elect the governor, who was restricted to serving a two
year term and who lacked the authority to control or check legislative
power. In 1865 the popular election of governor was permitted and
allowance was made for a gubernatorial veto, although the veto could
be overridden by a majority vote in both houses of the legislature.
More expansively, the 1865 constitution made allowance for the
governor to initiate proposals for laws and it required other executive
officials to submit information to him upon request.
The slow and gradual realization of the most symbolic executive
authority occurred with the passage of the current (1895) Constitution.
This constitution provided for a true separation of the executive and
legislative branches and required direct popular election of the
governor. Uncharacteristic of other southern states, the document did
make allowance for a line item veto. Characteristic of such states, it
provided for the "long ballot" election of a myriad of constitutional
officers with whom the governor would share executive authority. 4
While the governor was afforded a "chief executive" primacy in the
document, the other officers were assured autonomy from gubernatorial
control in their direct relationship to the electorate and the legislature.
This subjugation of executive authority was both circumspectly
and artfully constructed.
At a time when the majority
of other states and the federal government were moving toward
executive centrality5, South Carolina grudgingly allowed for a separate
executive branch with limited checks over the legislature and power
diffused among the nine elected executive officials.
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This is not to imply that South Carolina was without rebellious
governors during this time period. The campaign of 1890 between
"Pitchfork " Ben Tillman and Alexander C. Haskell was extraordinarily
volatile with the subsequent victor, Tillman, pledging a platform of
reforms . Tillman biographer Francis Butler Simkins summarized many
of these as detailed in Tillman's inaugural address in December, 1890:
Numerous other reforms were advocated. A
commission should be appointed to examine the
management of the lunatic asylum. The state
penitentiary should be self-supporting and , to further
this end, restrictions on the hiring out of convicts
should be loosened without surrendering state
regulation of this labor. He repeated old demands for
a constitutional convention, the reapportionment of
seats in the legislature , the abolition of one of
Charleston's two seats in the Senate, and the
establishment of a uniform control of the
administration of local justice. He declared that the
assessment of taxes by popularly elected officials was
'an absolute and pitiable failure' and recommended
centraliz.ation of this function. . . . .6
But Simkins noted that his subsequent record of "educational,
constitutional, and administrative reform (was) so moderate that
conservative traditions were scarcely violated. " 7 Legislative supremacy
was never seriously challenged .
The movement into the twentieth century resulted in few changes.
When the wave of budget reform swept across the Federal and state
governments between 1910 and 1925, South Carolina ' s response was
measured and moderate. The U.S. Congress , in the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921, provided for the creation of an executive
budget with all budgetary requests centralized through the president.
Many state governments adopted similar plans with governors
controlling the budget submission process. As the ability to recommend
appropriations is an essential requisite to the ability to propose
meaningful legislation, these efforts enhanced the chief executive's role
Volume 24, 1996 \ 185
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both in controlling agencies and in directing the flow of their policy.
The South Carolina General Assembly, while recognizing the
virtues of consolidating the budget proposal process, was not willing to
escalate the governor's profile as an agent for affecting budget or
policy recommendations. The 1919 compromise provided for the
creation of a Budget Commission with a membership of three: the
governor, who served as chairman, the chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee, and the chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee. Ostensibly, this measure provided a deliberative forum for
the three primary budget actors in the state to · discuss and propose
fiscal policy. Practically , it ensured that the two legislative members
would always control the process.
By mid-century, the powers of this Commission, with the
governor in the minority, were substantial and included post as well as
pre-appropriation controls:
An examination of the minutes (State Budget

Commission, Minutes) of the last several years of the
existence of this Commission indicates that it
exercised extraordinary control over state finances. It
prepared the state budget, approved or disapproved
all transfers, set individual state employee salaries,
approved major equipment acquisitions, allocated a
significant amount of money out of the civil
contingent fund for agency expenditures, and had to
approve all expenditures by agencies that were even
the slightest bit out of the ordinary. 8
Thus by 1948 what began as an initiative to permit the governor,
as one member of three, limited prerogative to propose budgets had
evolved into a mechanism to provide the General Assembly, as two
members of three, control of much of the financial operations of
executive branch agencies, including the governor's own office. The
imbalance of power became more pronounced.
In 1950, the State Reorganiz.ation Commission proposed a new
budget organiz.ationplan to the General Assembly. This plan provided
for the consolidation of eight state agencies under the old Budget
186 / The Journal of Political Science
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Commission and the addition of two new members, the Treasurer and
the Comptroller General, to the body itself. This new construct,
renamed the State Budget and Control Board, was created statutorily
the same year. Once again, an action taken to affect presumably
progressive change had resulted in a further diminution of the
governor's authority. While the new Budget and Control Board was
comprised of a membership with the executive in the majority, the
governor now could cast only one vote of five. Moreover, the other
two executive members were in no way accountable to the governor
and were, in fact, dependent upon the legislature for appropriations to
maintain their own offices.
Governors were realizing no more success in exerting control
over executive branch operations during this same period. In a highly
publicized event in the 1930s, Governor Olin D. Johnston, depicted by
a lowcountry politician as "a young squirt from Spartanburg with a
labor background" 9 declared a state of rebellion, suspended habeas
corpus and called out the National Guard in an effort to force the State
Highway Commission to comply with his edicts. 10 Decades later,
Governors Robert McNair and John West would work diligently to
implement desegregation in the state educational systems while relying
more on persuasion and the symbolic prestige of the executive rather
than true constitutional or statutory authority.
When James B. Edwards was inaugurated in 1975, he had direct
control over the appointment of only two state agency beads: the
Chief of the State Law Enforcement Division and the Commissioner of
Labor. The other 168 agency directors and 32 university, college and
technical college presidents were appointed by and accountable to
independent boards and commissions. Although the governor at that
time appointed approximately 1,400 state and regional board and
commission officials, most served fixed terms varying from two to six
years. But even if a governor had all appointments affected, he would
control the governing boards of fewer than a dozen agencies. 11
Moreover, because the preponderance of members served fixed terms
with removal only for cause, there were no immediate sanctions for
defying a gubernatorial edict.
Beyond appointments and budgets, the greatest constraint on
executive authority was the constitutional provision that governors could
Volume 24, 1996 \ 187
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serve a single four year term. 12 Such a restnction was daunting
enough given the fact that the first year of the term was devoted largely
to organizational efforts and during the last year the office was
relegated generally to "lame duck" status. Governors were left with
only the interim two years to conceptualize, propose, mobilize a viable
coalition, implement, and evaluate. It is not surprising that governors
controlled little of the policy process and
championed few
programmatic initiatives. As a lot, their proposals were regarded
skeptically by their legislative brethren, and frequently they were
forced to rely on demagoguery to gain any measure of popular support.
As a consequence, the position was considered generally to be a
stepping stone to higher office, most notably the U.S. Senate. V.O.
Key described the situation as it pertained to then Governor Strom
Thurmond:
... The institutional structure almost perforce casts the
governor in the role of popular leadership and drives
the legislature to a role as defender of the status quo.
When the governor is independent, ambitious, and
aggressive, he has a head-on collision with the
legislature. And, says a senator, governors propose
ambitious programs, not out of any sincere regard for
the needs of the people, but as a means to higher
office. That behavior points to the principle that mass
welfare can often, and perhaps only, be advanced by
harnessing to it forces seeking private or personal
advantage. Governor Thurmond, a senator opined in
early 1948, "is one of those who is trying to build
himself up for the Senate and he is full of a program
of his own and full of things he wants to do, and we
just naturally come into conflict. " 13
While such criticism seems harsh, a biographical survey of South
Carolina governors during the twentieth century reveals that no fewer
than six were elected subsequently to the U.S. Senate. This datum is
even more striking when one considers that the two seats have been
occupied continuously since 1956 and 1966 by Strom Thurmond and
188 / The Journal of Political Science
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Ernest Hollings, respectively. Table One identifies the six governors
with their gubernatorial and senatorial terms noted.
With the movement into the latter part of the twentieth century,
the pos1non remained somnambulant both politically and
administratively. As to governance potential, it continued to function
more effectively "as a platform for generating public expectations than
as an instrument for satisfying such expectations." 14

1980-Present: The Evolving Executive

The 1970s became embryonic years for the growth of the
governor's authority. During the administrations of Robert McNair
(1965-71) and John West (1971-75) the governor's office was expanded
substantially as federal funds flowed into the state. Much of the federal
enabling legislation required the governor to be the state trustee for
various grant programs, thereby providing him the opportunity to affect
a broader range of financial decisions. McNair created a Division of
Planning and Grants to work with legislators and local government
officials in determining eligibility for grants and making application.
West structured a Division of Administration through which many of
these grants were administered. For the first time, governors had
administrative responsibility for processes beyond their own anteroom.
James B. Edwards (1975-79), as the first Republican inaugurated
since Reconstruction, learned quickly the importance of developing and
selling a nonpartisan agenda in order to mollify the Democratcontrolled legislature. Relying on such support, Edwards sought to
overhaul the social services bureaucracy and construct a corporate
management structure for the Budget and Control Board.
But the next three administrations truly saw the emergence of the
authoritative executive. Richard Riley (1979-87), a progressive
reformist, avidly sought a forum for redefining executive power. He
employed his staff in this quest, and they were frequently to be found
in the legislative chambers, lobbying for the Governor's programs.
Riley was also successful in generating support for a constitutional
amendment to permit reelection for a second four year term. This
constitutional change, coupled with Riley's reelection in 1982,
Volume 24, 1996 \ 189
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Table One:
Twentieth Century South Carolina Governors
Subsequently Serving in the U.S. Senate'

QQyw]Q[

Term as Governor

Term in the U.S . Senate

Coleman L. Blease

1911- 1915

1925-31

Olin D. Johnston

1935-39; 1943-45

1945-65

Burnet R. Maybank

1939-41

1941-54

J. Strom Thurmond

1947-51

1954-56; l 956-present2

Ernest F . Hollings

1959-63

1966-present

Donald S. Russell

1963-65

1965-66

' One governor, James F. Byrnes, served in the U.S . Senate from 1931-41 prior to his
gubernatorial term from 1951-1955.
' Strom Thurmond resigned from the Senate in April , 1956 and was reelected in
November , 1956
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effectively redefined the power base for the modem governor. No
longer was he simply a personality to be tolerated for four short years;
eight years were long enough to propose and implement programs.
Moreover, the campaign for reelection could be used to secure an
electoral mandate for a political agenda. Finally, tenure across two
terms was sufficient to give a governor control over all of the
appointments to which he was entitled, even those involving fixed,
staggered terms.
Riley proceeded to realize these expectations in his successful bid
to have the Education Improvement Act passed in 1984. What is
commonly appreciated as his most significant legislative
accomplishment could.never have been achieved within the scope of a
single term. Sufficient time would not have existed to align the right
forces politically, mobilize extensive public support, and negotiate
enough compromises legislatively to ensure a winning coalition.
The two terms of Carroll A. Campbell, Jr. (1987-95) expanded
gubernatorial authority even further. Campbell, an intelligent,
aggressive Greenville Republican, had served four terms in the U.S.
House of Representatives on the prestigious Ways and Means
Committee. He knew national politics, he possessed a keen sense for
bargaining legislatively, and he was not reticent to use partisan politics
to the advantage of his governorship.
In the first term, Campbell carefully but consistently pursued
opportunities to promote gubernatorial power and prestige. Economic
development initiatives became his forte, and he developed strong
rapport with the business leadership of the state. This alliance was
sustained with every major initiative he brought forth over the eight
years.
Campbell also moved to establish more ownership of the
budgetary process. Lacking statutory authority, he nevertheless sent his
own executive budget to the Budget and Control Board and the
legislature in 1988. This process continued for each of the following
four years. Finally, in 1993, the budgetary statutes were revised to
allow the governor the authority to solicit agency requests and submit
an executive budget, annotating his priorities.
Beyond design, however, circumstances also conspired to enhance
the gubernatorial base of authority. Hurrir;ane Hugo ravaged the state
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in September, 1989, and the focal point of response and recovery
became the governor's office. Campbell nego~ted a substantially
reduced state match for federal disaster assistance with the Bush
administration and appointed a blue ribbon recovery commismon with
two former governors as members. Concurrently, he rejected pleas
to convene a special legislative session. The implication was obvious:
the crisis required immediate executive action not legislative
deliberation. Surprisingly, the legislative leadership concurred with his
decision and ultimately _the eruJ,,vindicated the means. Within a year,
South Carolina had substantially recovered from a natural catastrophe
exceeding $7 billion in damages.
An even heavier pall descended upon the state in 1990 when a
federal sting operation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
investigated legislative vote buying, violations of the Hobbes Act and
other state corruption. When the indictments were returned, 28 state
officials and lobbyists were implicated. All but one were subsequently
found guilty or pleaded guilty. 1.s
Two events transpired in the aftermath. The first involved
extensive legislative dialogue on the necessity for strengthening the
state's ethics laws. This culminated in the passage of one of the
strictest ethics laws among the 50 states in September, 1991. Much of
the regulatory focus in the legislation centered upon the legislatorlobbyist relationship.
The second event had more profound implications for executive
authority and consolidation. Carroll Campbell in his 1991 state of the
state address demanded a restructuring of state government "ripped
open by scandal." Within a month, he had signed an executive order
creating the Commission on Governmental Restructuring, cochaired by
Lt. Governor Nick Theodore and House Judiciary Chairman David
Wilkins. This commission met for six months, conducted extensive
hearings and in September, 1991 recommended a 15 department cabinet
appointed by the governor. Concurrently, the State newspaper launched
a series entitled "power failure" which would run into 1992 and
chronicle many of the dysfunctions of state government.
In 1992, the General Assembly began considering the reform
package in earnest. In the House of Representatives, restructuring
deadlocked and Speaker Bob Sheheen cast the deciding vote for its
192 / The Journal of Political Science
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adoption. The Senate was even more equivocal. Its leadership
consistently implored Campbell to compromise on various aspects of
the commission proposal, which he refused to do. Finally, in the
waning hours of the session, the plan died on a procedural technicality
without ever coming to a vote.
Restructuring proponents began again the following year with an
altered plan and a new strategy. This new plan called for the
consolidation of 170 state agencies into 69, ten of which would be
cabinet agencies immediately, with three more to be added over the
next two years. Notably, the governor's authority to appoint and
remove the cabinet agency directors was absolute and his authority to
appoint and remove the board/commission membership for the
noncabinet agencies was expanded substantially.
Strategically the House leadership, with the support of the
Governor, decided to link the restructuring statutes and the
appropriations bill. While restructuring would be addressed in separate
legislation, the appropriations bill also would be drafted to reflect the
restructured entities. Should the former fail, the latter would necessarily
prevail, if there was to be a budget at all. The strategy proved
successful and on June 18, 1993, the bill was signed into law·.
Campbell had little time during his final term to accomplish more than
the realignment of the restructured entities, but his successor, David M.
Beasley (1995-present) would wield cabinet government as an
authoritative instrument of gubernatorial control.
Beasley, a young attorney and banker from the Pee Dee area, had
previously served as the Speaker pro tempore in the S.C. House of
Representatives. He was supported in his election bid by Campbell's
political organization, the Christian Coalition, and the majority of the
business establishment within the state. From the inaugural address
through the first 18 months in office, his administration appeared
committed to two imperatives: expanding the economic vitality and
growth of the state and realizing a larger role in the governance
process.
His approach to cabinet governance has been most evidently
reflected in three areas: appointments, the development of
"subcabinets", and the coordination of cabinet agency functions through
the governor's staff. All three underscore the primacy of accountability
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and control, but they also highlight some of the difficulties attendant to
moving a cumbersome bureaucracy in a coordinated and purposeful
direction.
The appointment of the Beasley administration cabinet was a
studious process. All prospective candidates for director and deputy
director positions were extensively screened, and for at least two
cabinet posts, extensive national searches were conducted. The finalists
were subjected to an extensive series of interviews with the governor's
staff, selected external substantive area experts and ultimately with the
Governor himself. Such a process appears routine given the
conventional norms of business and government. In South Carolina,
however, the route to an agency directorship had customarily required
tenacity and seniority, and these selection standards were extraordinary
in their thoroughness.
The development of the subcabinet concept was even more
unconventional. Not content with simply structuring cabinet meeting
and processes, Beasley immediately installed a series of analytical
teams formed around substantive policy area groupings within the
cabinet. The intention was to coordinate public policy and programs
with similar missions and goals, irrespective of where they might
institutionally reside. A residual benefit of the subcabinet approach has
been the reduction of intra-cabinet rivalry and an increased
understanding of shared responsibility across agency boundaries.
Finally, the administration's consolidation and coordination of
cabinet agency lobbying and public affairs through the governor's staff
has essentially solidified control in two vital areas-legislative and press
relations. The governor's own staff crafts the message for these
sensitive constituencies, and they ensure that the information is both
consistent and palatable politically.
These changes, and many more modest ones which extend from
those articulated above, have revitalized the role of the governor in
South Carolina. Table Two provides a pre- and post-transformation
analysis of the more substantial gubernatorial authorities and powers.
Beyond the events described above, however, there are other, more
intrinsic reasons for these changes in the role of the South Carolina
chief executive. One of the more compelling explanations may reside
with the shifting trends in the political culture of the state itself.
194 / The Journal of Political Science

Transformationof GubernatorialPower & Privilege

Table Two
Gubernatorial Authorities and Powers:
Pre- and Post-Transform ation

Authoritv/Power<Y ear\

Pre-Transformation

Post Transformatio n

Appointment (! 993)

Approx . 1,500 state and regional
appis; controlled 12 agencies
indirectly through lay boards

Approx . 1,500 state and
reg . appts. ;appoinlS the
directors of 13 cabinet
agencies; controls another 8
agencies through lay boards

Removal (1993)

Limited removal of board appts.
for cause

All appointees, except
regulatory commissioners,
serve at the pleasure of the
governor

Tenure (1981)

A single four year term;
ineligible for reelection to a
consecutive term

Eligible for reelection to a
second consecutive term

Proposed budget as chairman of

Statutory authority to submit
executive budget proposal
for all agencies, cabinet and
noncabinet

Budget authority (1993)

5 person Budget and Control Bd.
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Mired in the Traditionalistic Culture
The model of the impotent executive which dominated in the state
for the first two centuries probably evolved from any number of
antecedents: the colonial fear of the king's tyranny, the legislature's
regard for a stronger executive as a zero sum game power proposition,
perhaps even concerns over mirroring a Federal presidential role.
Whatever the reasons and imagined provocations, two centuries of a
powerless executive served to institutionalize and even venerate the
legislative state. By the first half of the twentieth century, South
Carolina's governor was not only a hollow vestige of authority, but the
office has been rendered a cultural relic.
In American Federalism, Daniel J. Elaza.r argues that there are
three major types of American political culture: traditionalistic,
individualistic, and moralistic. 16 Each culture emanates from a variety
of ethnic, religious , political and sociological dispositions and
expectations of a populace and may vary according to geographic
section and region.
The traditionalistic culture is distinctly Southern in origin. This
culture involves a citizenry, generally depicted as undereducated and
lacking in initiative, deferring to a elitist social hierarchy.
Governmental structures are paternalistic, and enormous emphasis is
placed on preserving the status quo. Political processes are not overtly
competitive in that the hierarchy, both social and political, is
entrenched and well defined with seniority being the definitive factor
in determining political ascendency.
The individualistic culture derives from the mid-Atlantic states and
views politics and political processes as market commodities. Political
values and resources are accepted or rejected according to their merit
and viability. Thus ideas, including strategies for change, may be
"bought, sold, or traded" according to their competitive appeal. The
individualistic culture places a high premium upon political options and
policy choice. Of course, implicit in this reasoning is an informed and
responsible electorate.
The third political culture, the moralistic, stems from a New
England orientation. This culture encompasses attitudes and opinions
predicated upon a sense of civic responsibility or common good. It is
196 / The Journal of Political Science
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inherently moralistic in that it ascribes "higher value" reasoning to
political participation. Somewhat tautologically, increased participation
in the political process serves to spread this sense of civic responsibility
and is most desirous.
Elazar's traditionalistic culture merits examination regarding its
ability to explain South Carolina's historic legislative-executive
imbalance. Most assuredly, the true bastion of state power, the General
Assembly, had been a rigidly structured political and social hierarchy
with service longevity being the imperative for promotion.
With regard to the paternalistic attributes oflegislative rule, V.O.
Key described the role of the legislature, particularly the Senate, in the
"natural" order of the state:
Such is the formal allocation of governmental powers
in South Carolina: a weak executive, a legislature that
takes a hand in the management of administrative
departments, and a legislature whose county
delegations, with the senator a kingpin, in effect,
govern their respective counties. And within the state
the position of the legislature is accorded due
recognition. To a higher degree than elsewhere in
the South, public attention-as
measured by
newspaper coverage and by observation of the
attitudes of politicians over the region-is focused on
the legislature, where, as between the two houses, the
senate holds primacy. And the senate regards itself as
something of a gentleman's club, not without reason
for South Carolina senators are a cut-a broad
cut-above above the usual run of state legislators. 17
The governor, in spite of the deference afforded him in the
ceremonial exercise of his office, was not a member of the legislative
cabal and was entitled to only a modicum of true power. Moreover, the
General Assembly was far too attentive to legislative business to
concern itself with the chief executive. Speaker Emeritus Sol Blatt in
a revealing interview in 1982 acknowledged that in 50 years of state
service, he had only visited the governor's office six times when he
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was not invited. 18 Most commonly, what attention the governor was
afforded was addressed to "that fellow downstairs" in floor debate. 19
Nor could the governor capitalize on partisan politics. Because
state politics were effectively one party Democrat politics until well into
the 1970's, governors lacked the platform and the audience naturally
provided through partisan sparring. Ferrol Sams, Jr. retells a joke from
the pre-World War II era which illustrates the political solidarity and
intolerance in the Deep South at that time. It involves a rural school
teacher leading her students through tutorial exercises:
"Children, who paved the road in front of your
house?"
In response, the chorus, "Roosevelt!"
"Who put electricity in your house for you?"
"Roosevelt!"
Who gave your uncle a job in the WPA?"
"Roosevelt!"
Who got your grand daddy an old age pension?"
"Roosevelt!"
"All right, children. Now. Who made you?"
After a moment of silence one little boy asserted
stoutly, "God."
Whereupon a gallused, barefoot towhead leaped up in
the back row and yelled, "Throw that sorry
Republican out of here. "20
Clearly, the pre-transformation model of executive authority in
South Carolina was an artifact of a traditionalistic culture. The
legislature was the paternalistic influence, and there was little tolerance,
or need, for a competing force. Political processes were simple, and
politics were pursued according to a set of well understood rules, the
majority of which were embedded in legislative ritual and the seniority
system.
Attempting to explain the post-transformation model is more
problematic. For the first two centuries, it is reasonable to argue that
paternalistic politics were a function of static norms and a traditional
culture. However, any effort to explain political change, be it of
198 / The Journal of Political Science
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process or culture or both, should necessarily involve an ordering of
the causality. In this effort, the explanation becomes more tenuous.
Most assuredly, the past 15 years have seen the emergence of the
individualistic and moralistic cultures in South Carolina politics. And
clearly the executive institution has served as both a catalyst and a
symbol for perpetuating these cultures in competition with the
traditionalistic culture. What is uncertain is the extent to which
governors have effectively opened processes to affect a marketplace of
competing ideologies and ideas (individualistic) and forced a more
expansive definition of the common good (moralistic). Or rather have
these cultures developed independently through the gradual political
maturation of a populace with the chief executive as the principal
beneficiary?
More anecdotal support exists for the first view: that post-1980
governors have challenged the traditionalistic culture and provided the
other competing cultures a responsive forum. Should this be the case,
the power debate will be enjoined well into the next decade. As future
governors proselytize for more sympathetic and progressive cultures,
they will continue to campaign against the political orthodoxy which
built and sustained one of the last, great legislative states.

Luther F . Carter , is on leave from the University of Charleston and is serving
as Executive Director of the South Carolina Budget and Control Board
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